Ambidexterity and Survival in Corporate Venture Units by Hill, S. A. & Birkinshaw, J.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Hill, S. A. & Birkinshaw, J. (2014). Ambidexterity and Survival in Corporate 
Venture Units. Journal of Management, 40(7), pp. 1899-1931. doi: 
10.1177/0149206312445925 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/19337/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206312445925
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online





AMBIDEXTERITY AND SURVIVAL IN CORPORATE VENTURE UNITS 
 
 
Susan A. Hill 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE 
London 




London Business School 
Regents Park, NW1 4SA 
London 





We thank Marko Coh, Rick Delbridge, Felipe Monteiro, Phanish Puranam, Sebastian Raisch, 
Michiel Tempelaar and Freek Vermeulen for their valuable comments on earlier versions. We 
also acknowledge with thanks the contributions of action editor Laura Poppo and three 
anonymous reviewers. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting, Atlanta, in August 2006, where it received the Entrepreneurship 
Division’s Best High Potential/Fast Growth Paper Award.   
 
KEYWORDS: ambidexterity; corporate venture capital; corporate venture unit; relational 
context; survival 
Ambidexterity and Survival in Corporate Venture Units 
 2 
 




Corporate venture (CV) units constitute vehicles through which firms may act 
ambidextrously thereby increasing their longevity, but they suffer from a high failure rate. We 
examine why and how some CV units last significantly longer than others. We argue that CV 
units endure by developing an ambidextrous orientation themselves – they build new capabilities 
for the parent firm, while simultaneously leveraging its existing strengths. And we argue that CV 
units become ambidextrous by nurturing a supportive relational context, defined by the strength 
of their relationships with three different sets of actors – parent firm executives, business unit 
managers, and members of the venture capital community. Using primary data collected from 95 
CV units over a three-year period, we test and find support for these arguments. 
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An important driver of firm success in fast-changing markets is ambidexterity - the 
capacity to capitalize on an existing set of resources and capabilities whilst at the same time 
developing new combinations of resources to meet future market needs (Duncan, 1976; Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Although ambidexterity has been examined in 
multiple ways, the emerging consensus among strategic management and organizational scholars 
is to frame it in terms of the competing demands for exploration and exploitation (Gupta, Smith, 
& Shalley, 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008): where exploration involves ‘experimentation 
with new alternatives’ with returns that are ‘uncertain, distant and often negative’, and 
exploitation is the ‘refinement and extension of existing competencies, technologies and 
paradigms’ with returns that are ‘positive, proximate, and predictable’ (March, 1991: 85). 
Prior research using empirical data (Leonard Barton, 1992; McNamara & Baden-Fuller, 
1999) and modeling techniques (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009) has shown that a strong 
focus on exploitation tends to drive out exploration, which in the long term results in stagnation 
and profitability problems. Accordingly, much of the ambidexterity literature seeks to identify 
ways to help firms enhance their capacity for exploration without sacrificing their exploitation 
abilities. Proposed approaches include setting up a separate ‘exploration’ unit (e.g. a research lab 
or new venture operation), fostering a supportive culture for new ideas, and improving top 
management’s ability to allocate resources towards exploration-oriented opportunities (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Tushman, Smith, Wood, Westerman, & 
O’Reilly, 2010).  
In this paper we focus on one common approach to enhancing firm ambidexterity, 
namely the establishment of a corporate venture (CV) unit, viz. a distinct entity controlled by the 
firm that has responsibility for investing in and developing new business opportunities (Block & 
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MacMillan, 1993). The prevailing view is that firms typically establish CV units to enhance their 
capacity for exploration, which is manifested in such specific goals as providing a ‘window’ on 
new technological opportunities, creating new growth options, and fostering a more 
entrepreneurial culture (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Basu & Phelps, 2009; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2006; Kanter, 1985; Wadwha & Kotha, 2006). However, such goals are seldom achieved: the 
overall success rate of CV units is regarded as poor, with many being closed down early and 
others struggling to meet their expectations. Paradoxically, a common problem with CV units is 
that they are frequently seen as too exploratory, investing in activities perceived as being either 
too far from the firm’s core business or too hard to integrate into its operations (Burgelman & 
Valïkangas, 2005; Chesbrough, 2000; Gompers & Lerner, 1998).  
 The current paper explores these issues through the research question: why and how do 
some CV units survive while others do not? Our research seeks to shed light on the specific 
challenges of managing a CV unit within a large firm, as well as how such activities contribute to 
the firm’s broader quest for ambidexterity. We make two core arguments. 
First, we argue that CV units endure by – themselves - developing an ambidextrous 
orientation. Their primary function, of course, is to build new business opportunities for their 
parent firm. But, unlike independent venture capitalists (VCs), they are expected to do so by 
building on certain firm resources (e.g. technologies, capital, people, the corporate brand), and to 
seek out ways of exploiting the fruits of their investments for the parent firm (e.g. by integrating 
new ventures into existing lines of business). It is their ability to reconcile the competing 
demands for exploration and exploitation, we suggest, that proves critical to the survival of CV 
units. While some CV units focus too closely on opportunities that are not linked to the core 
strengths of the firm, others stay too close to the parent and fail to create sufficiently new sources 
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of value. Long-term success for a CV unit involves charting a careful course between these two 
extremes. 
Second, we adapt the notion of contextual ambidexterity (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; 
Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) to the particular circumstances of the CV unit as a boundary-
spanning entity and argue that CV units become ambidextrous by nurturing a supportive 
relational context. The relational context of the CV unit is defined as the set of relationships with 
the key resource holders, internal and external to the firm, in which the unit is embedded. This 
relational context – which is distinct from the behavioral context construct that informs current 
understandings of contextual ambidexterity - facilitates the resource flows that enable the CV 
unit to simultaneously build new capabilities whilst also using the existing ones of the parent 
firm, in order to chart the course described above. 
Using a unique body of data from 95 CV units, we test and find support for both these 
arguments. Our dataset overcomes crucial limitations of previous studies in this domain: it 
includes both internally- and externally-oriented venture units (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999); and 
it incorporates measures of strategic and organizational antecedents of ambidexterity not 
available from archival sources (Dushnitsky, 2006; Maula, 2007). It represents, to the best of our 
knowledge, the most systematic study of CV units from primary sources to date. 
Overall, then, our paper makes two contributions. First, departing from conventional 
wisdom on CV units, we adopt an ambidexterity lens to provide new empirical evidence for why 
and how some CV units survive while others do not. Most prior literature has framed CV units as 
principally exploration-oriented entities, focusing on their innovation-related roles. We find that 
CV units in fact need to strike a delicate balance between exploring new opportunities and 
exploiting existing capabilities. This suggests some practical implications for executives who 
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manage corporate venturing activities. Second, we contribute to the academic literature on 
ambidexterity by providing insights into how a discrete organizational unit may need to be 
ambidextrous in its own right (rather than simply focused on exploration or exploitation) if it is 
to contribute to the firm’s long-term success. We also develop a novel perspective on how 
ambidexterity is achieved within boundary-spanning units, through advancing the notion of a 
relational context.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Exploration, Exploitation and Ambidexterity 
The literature on firm ambidexterity has grown dramatically in recent years (see reviews 
by Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & 
Souder, 2009), and different points of view have emerged on a number of fundamental issues. It 
is therefore important to clarify our position on two key matters. 
First, exploration and exploitation can be conceptualized either as poles on a single 
continuum or as discrete variables. Exemplifying the former, one common approach uses a 
single search distance (Cyert & March, 1963) dimension whereby local search is equated with 
exploitation and distant search with exploration (e.g. Martin & Mitchell, 1998; Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001). Here, exploration and exploitation are viewed as fundamentally incompatible – 
i.e. as representing trade-offs to firms (Gupta et al., 2006). The alternative approach, which is 
more dominant in ambidexterity literature and which we adopt here, is to conceptualize 
exploration and exploitation as distinct and separable modes of activity (e.g. He & Wong, 2004; 
Koza & Lewin, 1998; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004): where exploration involves the development 
of capabilities for the firm, while exploitation involves the use of existing firm capabilities 
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(Danneels, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Conceptually, this approach permits the possibility of 
synergies between exploration and exploitation (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009).  
Second, different points of view exist on how the exploration-exploitation duality can be 
most effectively managed.  The most well-known approach to doing so is structural separation, 
which involves creating exploration-oriented units (e.g. a research lab or CV unit) to work 
alongside established exploitation-oriented units (e.g. a manufacturing plant or sales force). The 
task of integrating their respective contributions is assigned to top management (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Galbraith, 1982; Tushman et al., 2010; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996).  
More recently, other approaches have been suggested. These include: temporal 
separation, which involves an organization switching back-and-forth over time between 
exploration and exploitation (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003); 
inter-organizational specialization, through which organizations engage in joint ventures, 
alliances and acquisitions to complement the (typically exploitive) dominant modality of their 
activities (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 2007); and the creation of a 
supportive organization context that provides the cues encouraging individuals to make choices 
about dividing their time between exploration and exploitation (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Gulati & Puranam, 2009). There are merits to all these approaches, which we do not view strictly 
as alternatives; rather, we expect firms to utilize various combinations thereof in seeking to 
become ambidextrous.  
Moving to the specific setting under investigation here, CV units are typically positioned 
in the literature as singularly exploration-focused: they focus on the financing and development 
of “new business ventures” (De Bettignies & Chemla, 2008), that “fall outside the scope of the 
current concept of strategy” (Burgelman, 1983: 61). However, a closer look at the activities of 
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CV units suggests that they can embody both explorative and exploitive modes of activity 
(Campbell, Birkinshaw, Morrison, & van Basten Batenburg, 2003; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Keil, Maula, Schildt, & Zahra, 2008; Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005; Tidd & Taurins, 1999; 
Williams & Lee, 2009). Combining these modalities permits them to focus on their new business 
development activities whilst also ensuring that their work builds on and is integrated with that 
of the rest of the firm (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). And for this to happen, we suggest, a 
supportive relational context needs to embed the CV unit. 
Ambidexterity and CV Unit Survival 
We focus first on the relationship between ambidexterity and the survival of the CV unit. 
Survival is an appropriate dependent variable for our study for two reasons. First, CV units are 
highly prone to premature closure which makes survival the key criterion of success over their 
first few years of operation (Burgelman & Valïkangas, 2005; Campbell et al., 2003; Fast, 1979, 
1981; Gaba, 2007). Research into the VC industry (on which many CV unit practices have been 
built) shows that most VC funds require seven or eight years before they are able to show a yield 
on their start-up investments (Gompers & Lerner, 1998, 2001). However, the cycle of change in 
large organizations is shorter, with the average tenure of the CEO of a large company being only 
six years (Kaplan & Minton, 2006), and changes in strategy occur at least this frequently. It is 
therefore likely that executives in large organizations will make strategic decisions regarding the 
fate of their CV units before those units have had time to show whether they have been 
successful or not (Burgelman & Valikangas, 2005; Dushnitsky, 2006).  
The second reason we focus on survival is that CV units, by their nature, are created to 
meet multiple and varying objectives (e.g., one may focus on financial return, another may focus 
on strategic criteria; Campbell et al., 2003; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Maula, 2007), so survival is 
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the only truly common objective across our sample. It also helps that survival can be measured 
objectively, and at a separate point in time than the other variables, whereas other measures of 
performance tend to be subjective. 1 
We suggest that CV units will increase their prospects for survival to the extent that they 
develop an ambidextrous orientation. There are three parts to our argument. First, capability-
building takes place over time and through a path-dependent process, which suggests that CV 
units will be most effective when they invest in activities that build on and extend the firm’s core 
capabilities (cf. Gompers & Lerner, 1998; Keil et al., 2008; Schildt et al., 2005; Sykes, 1986; 
Thornhill & Amit, 2001). In order to identify new combinations (Schumpeter, 1934) for the 
parent organization, the CV unit will need to possess sufficient absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990) to identify and evaluate new opportunities. The foundations for these activities 
reside in the existing knowledge and competence bases to which the CV unit has access. 
The interplay between drawing on existing capabilities and developing new ones may 
also enable CV units to develop unique or unusual resource combinations that result in 
competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Katila and Ahuja (2002) find a similar 
synergistic effect for the combination of new knowledge with knowledge that is already known 
to a firm. Drawing on, but also extending, the core capabilities of the parent firm may present 
new value creation opportunities to the firm that are fairly unique to corporate venturing within 
the private equity investment domain (Dougherty, 1995).  
Second, the extent to which CV units integrate their activities with those of other units in 
the organization is likely to increase their chances of survival. One of the core principles of 
organization design is that high levels of differentiation need to be matched with high levels of 
integration (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). CV units, by their nature, tend to 
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become relatively isolated from the mainstream activities of the organization, and in extreme 
cases such units may be spun off. For example, Nokia Venture Partners was renamed BlueRun 
ventures in 2005, when Nokia reduced its ownership to a minority stake, to reflect that the 
operation had become ‘an independent, globally focused fund’ (Haley, 2005). To avoid this 
happening, managers of CV units will often work hard to build linkages between their unit and 
other parts of the parent organization - for example, by putting senior line executives on their 
venture boards (Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). Such linkages increase the flow of technology, 
people and capital between the CV unit and the parent firm, making it easier for the CV unit to 
capitalize on the organization’s existing capabilities (and vice versa). Without demonstrable 
exchanges of this nature, the relevance of the CV unit to the parent firm quickly comes into 
question. 
Finally, overlaying these capability and integration based arguments; we suggest 
ambidexterity may play an important symbolic role in engendering perceptions of legitimacy 
amongst CV units’ key constituencies, enabling their survival (Meyer & Zucker, 1989; Oliver, 
1991). Like independent ventures with a ‘liability of newness’ (Stinchcombe, 1965), CV units 
often suffer from a lack of legitimacy within their institutional field because of the paucity of 
established models of corporate venturing (Chesbrough, 2000), and this reduces their likelihood 
of survival (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). An ambidextrous positioning (and associated discourse) may 
help a CV unit to overcome both cognitive and socio-political obstacles to engendering 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), enabling it to be both better understood and more accepted by 
internal and external constituencies. Specifically, ambidexterity may privilege their gaining of 
legitimacy through ‘optimal distinctiveness’ (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001: 552): ‘that is, to 
balance the need for strategic distinctiveness against that of normative appropriateness’. 
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Ambidexterity may also help overcome the cognitive obstacles of entrenched identity beliefs, 
through framing the new initiatives of the CV unit along existing schemas compatible with – or 
at least not in opposition to - valued identities in the parent company and amongst VC 
communities (Czernich, 2004; Dougherty & Hardy, 1996; Fiol, 1991; Reger, Gustafson, 
Demarie, & Mullane, 1994). 
Collectively, these arguments suggest a duality between exploration and exploitation in a 
corporate venturing setting: an exclusive focus on exploitation by the CV unit is likely to cause 
the unit to be folded back into the parent company, and an exclusive focus on exploration is 
likely to cause the unit to be spun off (Burgelman, 1984; MacKenzie, 1996). The simultaneity of 
high levels of exploration and exploitation optimizes the chances of CV unit survival. We 
therefore suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the level of venturing ambidexterity (i.e. the interaction of 
exploitation and exploration), the higher the likelihood of survival of the CV unit. 
Relational Context and Ambidexterity  
How does an organization or unit achieve ambidexterity? As we have already discussed, 
the CV unit is by definition structurally separated from the rest of the organization, in that it 
exists as a semi-autonomous entity with its own line of reporting into the parent. Hence, our 
focus here is on the contextual (especially, the social) characteristics that make it possible for a 
CV unit to build new capabilities whilst also integrating its activities with those of the rest of the 
firm. This approach does not deny the role of CV unit formal structure,  and we control for 
several structural variables in our analysis. Nonetheless, we propose that the particular nature of 
CV units as structurally separate, boundary-spanning entities makes a context-based explanation 
of ambidexterity particularly compelling. 
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A relational perspective on context. Our theoretical arguments focus on the CV unit’s 
relational context - the specific set of ties, internal and external to the firm, with key resource 
holders, in which the unit is embedded. We use the term relational to refer to ties that are 
embedded in social relationships, are typically long-term in nature, and are evaluated on a 
subjective basis; as distinct from transactional ties that are relatively arms-length, short-term, 
and objectively evaluated (c.f. MacNeil, 1974; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Rousseau, 1995; Uzzi, 
1996, 1997). 2 
Given the fast pace and unpredictability of the corporate venturing world, a purely 
transactional approach would not be effective: contracts would lack the requisite flexibility (and 
redrafting would likely prove expensive), and counterparties would lack sufficient sense of 
mutual obligation to be willing to provide the give-and-take necessary for the CV unit to operate 
effectively. The essence of ambidexterity in a CV unit is that managers make choices on an 
ongoing basis as to how best divide the work of the venture unit between exploration-focused 
and exploitation-focused activities. Shifts in priority between the two modes are frequently 
required. Such choices require careful judgment and considerable flexibility on the part of CV 
unit managers, and will therefore require a certain amount of give-and-take on the part of those 
individuals with whom the CV unit interacts. In such a context, a relational approach is likely to 
be superior. More embedded relationships, which promote resource pooling, cooperation and 
fast-paced adaptation (Uzzi, 1996, 1997), reduce the costs of effecting frequent shifts in 
orientation. Furthermore, the foundation of high trust and reciprocity that underlies relational ties 
means that such ties function better than transactional ties where expected pay-offs are more 
distant and/or evaluated more subjectively.  
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A relational view of context differs significantly from the concepts of structural context 
(Bower, 1970), in which behavior is shaped by formal rules and incentives, and behavioral 
context (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994), in which behavior is shaped by the tacit norms and values of 
the organization. Here, instead, context is characterized by a combination of access to resources 
from other actors (Pierce & White, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) plus the normative and 
social cues these actors provide. This combination of resource dependency and social support is 
highly relevant to the boundary-spanning context of the CV unit, in terms of the complex web of 
relationships it builds with other actors to ensure its survival (Chesbrough, 2000; Dushnitsky, 
2006; Maula, Autio, & Murray, 2005). 
Principal sets of stakeholders. We suggest that three principal sets of resource holders 
define the CV unit’s relational context - the senior managers in the parent firm, the managers in 
the other business units of the parent firm, and members of the VC community. Although some 
CV units may also engage with additional parties (such as entrepreneurial young firms, 
university scientists, suppliers or consumers), our research interviews suggested that these three 
sets of actors represent the principal network of resource holders with which CV units typically 
engage. 
Although the relationships the CV unit has with these sets of actors are each important in 
their own right, the real value comes from how they are used in combination. Indeed, it is useful 
to conceptualize the CV unit as a broker that draws on its social capital to seek out ways of 
bringing together insights and resources held by disparate actors with a view to creating new 
sources of value (Hargadon, 2002; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Obstfeld, 2005). By way of 
example, one CV unit manager in our sample became aware of an interesting start-up venture 
through his contacts in the VC community. He was able to broker a commercial relationship 
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between the start-up and one of the firm’s business units. He also persuaded the parent firm to 
invest in the start-up as part of a syndicate of VCs. This venture, which turned out to be highly 
successful, was thus made possible because the CV unit manager had developed strong 
relationships with all three sets of actors; was aware of their very different needs and priorities; 
and was able to put together an opportunity for value creation that others were unaware of. 
Two features of this brokerage role are particularly relevant to the challenge of 
developing an ambidextrous orientation in CV units. First, brokerage helps CV units to 
overcome one of the biggest challenges of ambidexterity, namely resource scarcity. While 
exploration and exploitation are potentially incompatible when critical resources are scarce (Cao 
et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2006), brokerage via a supportive relational context allows CV units to 
tap into a broader set of resources than those that they control in order to pursue relevant 
investment opportunities. Consequently, CV units will encounter to a lesser degree the zero-sum 
game between exploration and exploitation facing other units in the parent company which seek 
to access (primarily internal in origin) resources. 
Second, each set of actors in the CV unit’s network has attributes that can benefit both 
exploration and exploitation. At first glance, one might expect the CV unit to ‘explore’ through 
its relationship with the VC community and to ‘exploit’ through its relationships with other parts 
of the parent firm. However, a closer look suggests a more nuanced story: relationships with 
parent firm executives and with business unit managers are important for gaining access to 
investment capital, distribution channels, production facilities, R&D stocks, market intelligence 
and technology forecasts; while relationships with executives in the VC community give them 
access to capital for co-investment, new investment ideas, and a range of investing and 
enterprise-nurturing capabilities (Block & MacMillan, 1993; Maula et al., 2005; Siegel, Siegel, 
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&  MacMillan, 1988; Sykes, 1986). In addition, both internal and external parties may supply 
legitimacy to CV units (Keil, Maula, & Wilson, 2010; McNally, 1997). In other words, the 
stronger and more multi-faceted the relational context of the CV unit, the more likely it will be to 
secure the diversity of inputs it needs to become truly ambidextrous. 
In sum, these features indicate how ambidexterity in a CV unit is possible. A supportive 
relational context enables a CV unit to avoid getting mired exclusively in one learning mode, and 
thereby to retain a balance between exploration and exploitation. And, as many of the critical 
resources required for corporate venturing are secured from other parties, the resource 
constraints that would exist in a typical organization are mitigated for CV units. In sum, we 
suggest that the resource flows brokered by CV units across their networks of relationships 
enable them to function ambidextrously on behalf of their parent companies: 
Hypothesis 2. A positive three-way interaction occurs between the strength of a CV unit’s 
relationships with (a) senior executives in the parent firm, (b) other business units, and 
(c) the VC community, and the unit’s level of venturing ambidexterity. 
Relational Context, Ambidexterity and Survival  
Finally, we hypothesize that ambidexterity mediates the relationship between CV unit 
relational context and CV unit survival. This hypothesis centers around the notion that 
ambidexterity is a meta-capability that develops gradually over time (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004). In other words, we do not expect the impact of strong ties with key constituencies to 
generate immediate and direct survival benefits for CV units. Building a fertile relational context 
provides a necessary, but not sufficient, foundation for CV unit survival. Instead, strong ties 
between a CV unit and its key constituencies create the conditions that enable CV units to 
simultaneously manage exploration-focused and exploitation-focused activities. By achieving an 
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appropriate mix between utilizing existing capabilities and building new ones, CV unit managers 
enhance the odds that their unit will survive.  
The nature of this causal path, however, is that it is likely to transpire slowly.  A number 
of authors have recently characterized ambidexterity as a dynamic capability (e.g. Güttel & 
Konlechner, 2009; Jansen, Tempelaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2009; O'Reilly & Tushman, 
2008), noting the importance of developing routines that enable the firm (or the CV unit, in this 
instance) to "consciously ... orchestrate firm assets in a repeatable way" (O'Reilly & Tushman, 
2008: 201). Such routines typically develop over a period of months or even years. 
Thus, in our setting, building the embedded ties with key stakeholders that provide the 
high levels of trust, fine-grained information transfer and joint problem-solving (Uzzi, 1996, 
1997) required to support corporate venturing activities takes time for a CV unit to effect. 
Turning the resource flows resulting from such ties into viable entrepreneurial resource 
combinations takes time too, as do efforts to legitimate and broadcast these internally within the 
parent corporation.  
In sum, we expect a CV unit’s relational context to influence CV unit survival through 
the development of ambidexterity. If sufficient time is not given for a CV unit to develop the 
relational context that underlies its brokerage of critical resource flows, and to turn these 
resource flows into valued combinations which can then be observed by key decision-makers, 
this crucial survival-enhancing path will be disrupted. The premature closure of a CV unit, 
before it is able to realize its potential to its parent company, may then (and does frequently) 
result (Fast, 1979, 1981; Gaba, 2007). Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 3. Venturing ambidexterity mediates between the relational context and the 
likelihood of survival of the CV unit. 
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METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
Research Design and Sample Composition 
The research consisted of three phases. The first two phases were conducted in the 
second half of 2001 at the height of the corporate venturing boom3; the final phase was 
conducted in late 2003 during the downturn in corporate venturing. The first phase comprised 
exploratory interviews with 50 individuals in 40 CV units across eight countries, with the 
intention of understanding current practices pertaining corporate investment in corporate 
venturing. The second phase, building on the insights from the interviews, was a survey of 
managers of CV units. The sampling frame comprised CV units listed in the Corporate 
Venturing Directory and Yearbook 2001. A number of additional units with which we were 
familiar were also included in the sampling frame. Together these sources yielded 447 potential 
respondents to whom mail surveys were distributed. The most senior manager of each of these 
447 CV units was the subject of our communication. Follow-up calls and further investigation 
found 120 CV units to be inactive, resulting in a potential pool of 327 CV unit respondents. 
Responses were received from the heads4 of 95 units: an eventual response rate of 29%. 
The sample represented a broad cross-section of industries. Many responding CV units 
(48 percent) were from high-technology sectors, such as telecommunications, biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, electronics and IT. The remainder (52 percent) was from a variety of sectors, 
including oil and gas, automotive, manufacturing, consumer goods, transport and professional 
service sectors. The bulk of respondents were from Europe (48 units) and North America (44 
units); the remaining three units were from Asia. 
Respondents and non-respondents were compared along a number of indices for which 
comparative data was available. ANOVAs and cross-tabs did not find significant differences for 
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the age, monetary budget, average annual number of investments, number of employees, or 
preference for 17 types of funding (e.g. start-up funding, first stage funding, and so on) between 
responding and non-responding units. Significant differences were found in two areas: the 
proportion of European respondents was somewhat higher than expected, whilst fewer than 
expected responses were received from North American CV units (χ2 = 39.56, p = .000); and the 
proportion of respondents expressing a preference for seed funding was higher than amongst 
non-respondents (χ2 = 6.70, p = .010). Overall, these analyses suggest that respondents were not 
substantively different from non-responding units in our sampling frame. 
The third phase of the research was conducted in December 2003 to ascertain how many 
CV units had survived the severe downturn in venturing activity that took place during 2002 and 
2003. Follow-up phone calls were made to the managers of the CV units that had participated in 
the mail survey. They were asked whether their CV unit was still active. If the CV unit was no 
longer active, respondents were asked to recall the month and year in which the unit ceased 
operations. Of the 95 CV units in the sample, we were able to speak with a person from 81 of the 
units (85% of the sample). For the remainder, archival and web searches were used to ascertain 
the status of the unit. Of the original sample, 22 CV units (23%) were found to have closed down 
subsequent to the survey, while the remaining 73 (77%) were still active. 
Dependent and Independent Measures 
The bulk of our measures are derived from the 2001 mail survey. As no other studies (to 
our knowledge) had used survey methodologies to examine the structures and management 
practices in contemporary CV units, we developed the measures drawing on prior literature 
where possible, as well as on constructs emerging from the exploratory interviews. Using our 
final sample, we conducted numerous analyses (described below) to verify that our measures 
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were sound. Table 1 details the operationalization of the multi-item measures, and their 
properties. PCA demonstrated all items to load on a single factor in each measure, and 
Cronbach’s alphas were all within acceptable levels (ranging from .66 to .87). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Survival. A CV unit was considered to be a survivor if it was still active (i.e. continuing 
to invest in ventures) within its original parent company in December 2003. This date was 
chosen on the basis of our judgment about how the corporate venturing industry was evolving at 
that time. During 2002 and 2003 parent companies we were in contact with had reviewed their 
CV operations as a result of the dotcom crash, and the CV unit managers, in turn, had been 
required to justify why their unit should continue to operate. Such reviews had begun to tail off 
in the latter part of 2003, so we chose December 2003 as the date to take stock of which units 
had survived and which had not. It is worth noting that during this ‘third wave’ (during the 1990s 
and ending with the dotcom crash) of corporate venturing, the average longevity of CVC units 
was only 2.2 years (Dushnitsky, 2012), and that in general CV units are particularly susceptible 
to closure in their early years of operation (Gompers & Lerner, 1998). Thus, our two-year 
window between survey and follow-up appears to provide a reasonable timeframe over which to 
capture a significant portion of survival decisions for units in our sample. The dummy variable 
was coded ‘1’ if a CV unit was still active late in 2003 (i.e. a survivor unit), and ‘0’ where it was 
not (i.e. a non-surviving unit). 5 
Venturing ambidexterity. We chose to develop new measures for the constituent 
elements of ambidexterity, viz. exploration (building new capabilities for the parent firm) and 
exploitation (making better use of the existing capabilities of the parent firm) (cf. Danneels, 
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2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). This decision was informed by the absence of any widely accepted 
measure of ambidexterity at the time, and the focus of extant measures on organizational levels 
of innovation (Atuaheme-Gima & Murray, 2007; He & Wong, 2004; Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & 
Veiga, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). The latter focus is inconsistent both with a unit level 
of analysis and with the broad and varied mandates of CV units (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Chesbrough, 2002; Keil, 2002; Maula, 2007), in which innovation is seldom the exclusive 
component. We hence developed exploration and exploitation measures tailored to the CV 
setting based on a three-step process. This process combined the grounded development of items 
through interviews with CV unit managers, as well as scholarly expert ratings of the proposed 
items for congruence with March’s (1991) definitions of exploration and exploitation. 
First, we listened to how our interview respondents described the value-adding part of 
their work, and we developed a list of pertinent activities. For example, the head of British 
Telecom’s Brightstar CV unit described such activities as making better use of the parent 
company’s technologies, and providing opportunities for talented but frustrated engineers, 
whereas the head of Siemens’ Mustang Ventures emphasized such activities as providing a 
window on new technologies and creating breakthrough technologies for Siemens Corporation. 
Second, we reviewed and condensed this list by iterating back and forth between the phrases our 
interviewees used and concepts we were able to draw from the CV literature. Once we had our 
draft items, we checked their wording with two CV unit managers (who were not in the 
interview sample). Third, we performed a q-sort procedure, whereby four expert scholars 
familiar with both the corporate venturing and ambidexterity literatures assessed the draft items 
for their congruence with the constructs of exploration and exploitation. This process resulted in 
the development of two scales (see Table 1 for the specific wording of items). 
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Use existing capabilities (exploitation). A four-item measure which examined 
exploitative CV unit objectives resulted from the three-step development process described 
above. The items were concerned with CV unit mandates involving the effective utilization of 
the parent company’s assets and capabilities in broad (e.g. “better use of existing corporate 
assets”), with the parent company’s human asset utilization in particular (e.g. “retention and 
motivation of our employees” and “source of funding for internal entrepreneurs”), and with 
monetizing the existing technologies and intellectual capital of the parent company (“e.g. 
creation of spin-out companies”).  
Build new capabilities (exploration). This three-item measure examined the extent to 
which CV units strove to develop new capabilities for the parent company, e.g. by creating new 
breakthrough technologies and providing a window on emerging technologies (Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006). 
Ambidexterity. We examined the psychometric properties of the exploitation and 
exploration measures using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We compared our proposed two-
factor model (with each item constrained to load only on its anticipated factor) to an alternative 
one-factor model using AMOS. The proposed two-factor model demonstrated good fit with the 
data (χ2 = 22.39, df = 13, p = .05; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .09), while the alternative one-factor 
model exhibited poor fit (χ2 = 78.69, df = 14, p < .001; CFI = .39; RMSEA = .22). This suggests 
that exploration and exploitation are both theoretically and empirically distinguishable in the CV 
unit context. Convergent validity was also indicated by all item loadings being significant (p < 
.05) and in the expected direction in the two-factor model. 
Analytically, we operationalized ambidexterity as the product of exploration and 
exploitation (c.f. Atuahene-Gima & Murray, 2007; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen, Van den 
Ambidexterity and Survival in Corporate Venture Units 
 22 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2005, 2006). This approach is consistent with our predictions regarding 
synergistic effects of high levels of both exploration and exploitation in CV units. Alternative, 
less frequently used operationalizations of ambidexterity include: (1) the ‘balance’ between 
using existing capabilities and building new capabilities; and (2) ‘additive’ measures examining 
total levels of exploration and exploitation (He & Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006). We 
conducted robustness checks against these alternative operationalizations in post-hoc analyses. 
Relationship with senior executives (in the parent firm). To assess the strength of a 
CV unit’s relationship with its parent firm executives, we asked CV unit managers to indicate 
how frequently members of the unit communicated with: (1) the senior executives to whom the 
CV unit reported, and (2) other senior executives in the corporate parent. In constructing these 
items, we follow in an established tradition whereby the frequency of interaction between ties is 
taken as a proxy of the strength of their relationship. 6 
Relationship with business units. Per the senior executive relationship measure, CV 
unit managers indicated (along three items) how frequently they communicated with executives, 
technical/R&D people and managers in the firm’s other business units. 
Relationship with the VC community. CV unit managers rated the frequency of 
communication between the unit and members of the VC community (a two-item measure). 
Control Measures 
Finally, a number of control measures were utilized in the analyses. Single-item measures 
for the number of full-time employees (or equivalent part-time employees) in the CV unit, the age 
of the unit (in years), and the number of investments the unit had undertaken, were used to 
control for possible ‘economies of scale’ and ‘learning curve’ effects on CV units - potentially 
enabling both the creation of venturing ambidexterity and CV unit survival. 
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We also created three dummy variables. A hi-tech sector variable identified whether or 
not each parent company’s main line of business was in a high-technology industry (i.e. 
electronics and computing; telecommunications; and biotechnology, medical and pharmaceutical 
industries). Another dummy variable, financing structure, examined whether a CV unit’s 
investments were subject to internal review (coded ‘1’), or were financed via a closed fund or a 
‘separate pot’ of money (coded ‘0’): a structural dimension which may affect units’ relationships 
with internal constituencies, as well as their latitude to engage in investments diverging from 
parent company strategy and investment practice. Finally, CVC (corporate venture capital) 
investments, examined whether a CV unit had investments recorded in the VentureXpert 
database in the two-year period prior to the survey (coded ‘1’ where it did, ‘0’ where it did not). 
This measure indicates whether a unit invested in external investments, a key dimension in CV 
unit typologies (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). As a complementary measure, a three-item internal 
investments measure captured the relative emphasis placed by a CV unit on internally-generated 
investments. 
The autonomy of CV units was assessed along two dimensions. Autonomy (vertical) – a 
four-item measure - assessed the extent to which CV unit managers had the authority to make 
various types of investment decisions. Autonomy (horizontal) examined how extensively other 
business units within the parent company were involved in decision-making on the CV unit’s 
investments. Three items identified arenas for CV unit decision involvement with business units. 
We also attempted to control for the impact of perceived CV unit performance on the 
ambidexterity and survival of CV units. Respondents were asked to assess the performance of 
their CV unit on dimensions identified in the exploratory interviews. CV unit managers rated the 
performance of their unit against expectations over the past 3 years (or its period of operation, if 
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shorter) on 18 items, reflecting a broad range of objectives. When factor analyzed, we found 4 
items to consistently load on a strategic performance dimension and 3 items to load on a 
financial performance dimension. Additionally, we produced a multiplicative interactive 
measure (strategic X financial performance), to control for the possibility that CV units might be 
expected to achieve a mix of both strategic objectives and acceptable levels of financial return. 
These three performance measures were included as control variables when testing H1. 
Checks for Common Method Bias 
As our survey data may be prone to single-source, common method bias (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), we took a number of steps to assure ourselves that such 
biases did not pose a significant threat to our analyses. Most critically, as mentioned previously, 
we gathered CV unit survival data as a relatively objective independent outcome measure for the 
CV units. This data was collected two years after all other data, so the responses we received 
were unlikely to be influenced by the earlier round of data collection. 
Additionally, we investigated the threat posed by common method variance within the 
mail survey by subjecting the data to a Harman one-factor test. We conducted principal 
component analysis (PCA) on all items making up our six independent and dependent variables. 
Six factors were found with eigenvalues greater than 1.00. In total, these explained 75 percent of 
the variance, with the first factor accounting for only 26 percent of the total variance. If common 
method bias were a serious problem in our data, one factor accounting for most of the covariance 
in the independent and dependent variables should have emerged (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, we collected archival data from the VentureXpert database to act as a 
validity check on the investment history data reported by survey respondents. The self-reported 
responses were highly consistent with the VentureXpert data (for the 71 units for which data was 
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available), thus providing us with a fair degree of comfort in the accuracy of the self-reported 
measures. Specifically, both the number of CV unit investments reported by respondents and the 
proportion of the portfolio experiencing liquidity events reported highly significant correlations 
(p = .000) with the comparable VentureXpert data. 
Analysis 
We tested our hypotheses with path analysis via the Mplus software (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2007). Specifically, we used maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors. 
Path analysis via Mplus was deemed well-suited to simultaneously testing the hypothesized 
interaction and mediation effects within our fairly small dataset, which combined continuous and 
binary outcome variables. Due to the limited sample size, we used mean scores as single 
indicators of the latent constructs in our model.  
As our hypotheses involve testing interaction terms, we mean-centered the independent 
variables in order to reduce the threat of multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). An inspection 
of the variance inflation factor (VIF) indices, with mean values approximating 2.00, indicated 
these to be well within accepted limits (typically, VIF’s below 10, or a more conservative 
threshold of 5.00) (Cohen, West, Cohen, & Aiken, 2002; Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004). In 
addition, no obvious problems regarding the stability of coefficient estimates and their standard 
errors across models (Kutner et al., 2004) were discernable. Accordingly, multicollinearity does 
not appear to be of significant concern. 
FINDINGS 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables are shown in Table 2. 
This table indicates that, in terms of the antecedents of ambidexterity, none of the separate 
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measures of CV unit relationships with the three constituencies are significantly correlated with 
exploitation; all are, however, significantly correlated with exploration. Additionally, although 
exploration and exploitation are not significantly correlated with CV unit survival, relationships 
with parent firm executives (r = .21, p < .05) and with the VC community (r = .26, p < .05) are. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
Structural models. In testing our first two hypotheses, we first tested the fit of the 
hypothesized model. This model was compared to four other nested models: (a) a null model 
(model 1), in which all covariances were set to zero; (b) a baseline model (model 2) from which 
both the higher-order interaction effects posited in H1 and H2 were omitted; (c) a model (model 
3) that included the posited H1 two-way interaction between venturing ambidexterity and 
survival; and (d) a model (model 4) that included the posited H2 three-way interaction between 
relationships with stakeholders and venturing ambidexterity. The Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-
squared difference test, which is suited to robust maximum likelihood estimation via numerical 
integration, was used to compare the models (Muthén & Muthén, 2009). The results are shown in 
Table 3, indicating the hypothesized model to demonstrate superior fit to the more parsimonious 
comparison models. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Having tested its fit and finding no signs of mis-specification, the hypothesized model 
allowed us to test our hypotheses. The results of this model, showing the standardized maximum 
likelihood parameter estimates and their statistical significance levels for the tests of H1 and H2, 
are summarized in Figure 1. Overall, strong support is provided for our first two hypotheses. 
------------------------------- 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
In support of H1, venturing ambidexterity was significantly and positively associated 
with CV unit survival (ß = 6.36, p < .01). While not hypothesized, exploration evidenced a 
marginally significant, positive effect on CV unit survival (ß = 2.86, p < .10), while exploitation 
showed no significant direct impact on survival (ß = -0.95, p = .28). 
H2, positing a positive relationship between CV unit relational context and degree of 
venturing ambidexterity, was also supported. The coefficient of the three-way relational context 
interaction (i.e. joint contact with members of all three communities) on venturing ambidexterity 
was positive and significant (ß = .08, p < .01). While not hypothesized, the direct effects of 
relationships with these three constituencies on ambidexterity were also positive and significant 
(executives: ß = .88, p < .05; business units: ß = .95, p < .05; venture capitalists: ß = 1.14, p < 
.001). These relationships hence also contribute independently to venturing ambidexterity. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2a & 2b about here 
------------------------------- 
Plotting this three-way interaction graphically facilitates further insight into the nature of 
the conditional effects of interaction with senior executives, other business units and members of 
the VC community on venturing ambidexterity. Figures 2a and 2b display these relationships, 
representing each of the three variables at one standard deviation from its (centered) mean 
(Aiken & West, 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). From a comparison of the charts, it is evident 
that increases in venturing ambidexterity were associated with greater contact with VCs, senior 
executives and other business units (refer to the upward-sloping lines in both figures).  
Furthermore, from Figure 2b it is evident that (consistent with our predictions in H2) the highest 
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levels of venturing ambidexterity occur when relationships with all three constituencies are 
strong.   
Test for mediation. Hypothesis 3 posits that venturing ambidexterity mediates the three-
way interactive relationship between a CV unit’s relational context and its likelihood of survival. 
We tested for such an indirect effect following the procedure outlined in Kline (2005): the 
coefficients for H1 and H2 were multiplied, and then subject to the Sobel test (1982, 1986). The 
finding was marginally significant (z = 1.93, p = .053; one-tailed), suggesting that ambidexterity 
may indeed mediate between CV units’ relational context and their likelihood of survival. 
Robustness checks. We also tested the sensitivity of our analyses regarding H2 to 
alternative operationalizations of ambidexterity. 7 Specifically, we compared the findings using 
our multiplicative ambidexterity measure against measures reflecting ‘balance’ and ‘additive’ 
(He & Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006) conceptions of ambidexterity. The ‘balance’ measure 
used the absolute difference between the exploration and exploitation scores of each unit; the 
‘additive’ measure addressed the total levels of exploration and exploitation in each unit. The 
three-way relational context interaction (ß = -1.19, p < .01) was found to be negatively and 
significantly related to exploration-exploitation ‘balance’. Employing the additive measure for 
ambidexterity resulted in non-significant findings for H2. 
In all, these robustness tests indicate that the synergistic interaction of exploration and 
exploitation – whose roots lie in strong relationships with multiple key constituencies - is critical 
to CV unit survival. This synergistic effect proves vital, rather than the total levels of exploration 
and exploitation within the CV unit, or the balance between the two. While this appears to 
contradict a small set of studies that have found consistent effects across more than one 
operationalization of ambidexterity (He & Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006), it is congruent 
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with a recent conceptual recognition of differing ‘ambidexterity dimensions’, with potentially 
divergent antecedents and performance implications (Cao et al., 2009). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Three important findings emerged from this research. First, survival was more likely in 
those CV units that rated high on using existing firm capabilities and building new firm 
capabilities. Second, ambidextrous CV units were characterized by high levels of interaction 
between the CV unit managers and three sets of actors (senior executives, other business units, 
members of the VC community), with the more ambidextrous CV units devoting high levels of 
attention to all three. Third, acting ambidextrously to some extent mediated between the strong 
relationships built by CV units with these three constituencies, and their increased odds of 
survival within the parent organization. We now consider the implications of these findings for 
the literatures on ambidexterity and corporate venturing. 
Implications for Ambidexterity  
This study complements the small but growing literature concerned with understanding 
the internal mechanisms through which organizations achieve ambidexterity. Our study 
reinforces an important point which sometimes gets overlooked, namely that an exploration-
oriented unit does not only explore – it must also develop the capacity to integrate its activities 
with those of its exploitation-oriented sibling units (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). In some 
organizational settings, the process of integrating activities across units is relatively 
straightforward. However, our research shows that, for CV units, the nature of integration 
required is sufficiently challenging that it necessitates – in itself - a form of intra-unit 
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ambidexterity. By this logic, ambidexterity can be viewed as a ‘nested’ phenomenon that exists 
at multiple levels of analysis within the organization (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
One key contribution of this study is to show how a unit’s ‘relational context’ is an 
important antecedent of ambidexterity. As this construct is new to the ambidexterity literature, it 
is useful to give some thought to the boundary conditions around its use – that is, to understand 
the settings where relational context, rather than behavioral context, is important. 
We regard CV units as a type of ‘boundary spanning’ unit (Thompson, 1967) that buffers 
the technical core of the firm from the turbulent business environment in which it is operating. 
Such boundary spanning units (including, for example, alliances and joint ventures, and business 
development units) typically have ostensibly ‘exploratory’ charters and provide linkages to 
various external actors. And, as noted above, they have to integrate their activities with those of 
technical core units. This often requires a level of ambidexterity on the part of the boundary 
spanning unit itself. 
Thompson (1967), of course, contrasted boundary spanning units with ‘technical core’ 
units that perform vital efficiency-oriented activities such as manufacturing, and typically have 
charters that are more exploitation-oriented. While both types of units will potentially benefit 
from developing a degree of ambidexterity, their primary roles and particular circumstances 
differ fairly considerably. In particular, boundary spanning units are typically externally-facing, 
lack formal structures, employ relatively small numbers of people, and are designed to be 
flexible, or even temporary; whereas technical core units are typically internally-facing, less 
flexible, and much larger.  
Accordingly, we propose that boundary-spanning units potentially achieve ambidexterity 
through their relational context, while technical core units are more likely to attain ambidexterity 
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through their behavioral context. The optimal balance between exploration and exploitation may 
also differ between these types of units, as well as over time. In addition, whilst technical core 
units face the risk of gradually becoming obsolescent if they fail to adapt, boundary spanning 
units typically face a far more immediate threat of closure should their performance falter, or 
priorities in the organization change: survival of the latter units being a crucial short-term 
priority. Ambidexterity may provide a critical means through which boundary spanning units 
enhance their likelihood of survival within the firm. In contrast, market performance may be a 
more significant outcome of contextual ambidexterity to technical core units. These propositions 
are outlined in Table 4 and constitute a subject for future research. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
While these arguments suggest a dichotomy between boundary spanning and technical 
core units, we recognize that there is rarely as pure a distinction in the real world. Organizational 
units may exhibit a combination of relational context and behavioral context routes to 
ambidexterity. Moreover, structural mechanisms may also be at work within organizational units. 
For example, Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine (1999) observed micro-level design features such as 
job-enrichment, switching and partitioning, all of which were intended to help production line 
workers to achieve a balance between flexibility and efficiency. So, while our study provides 
some useful new insights, it also opens up an important avenue for future research, namely to 
elucidate the conditions under which relational, behavioral, and structural mechanisms work 
alone or together to foster unit level ambidexterity.  
Another key feature of our study was to highlight access to resources as a facilitator of 
ambidexterity. Gupta et al. (2006) argued that one way to transcend the inherent tradeoffs 
between exploration and exploitation might be to relax the assumption of limited resources. Our 
Ambidexterity and Survival in Corporate Venture Units 
 32 
study provides a very clear example of how this idea might work in practice. Resource brokering 
strategies may provide one means through which organizations and their units may potentially 
overcome trade-offs imposed by resource scarcity (Cao et al., 2009).  
Moreover, the resources that a CV unit draws from its stakeholders do not only include 
tangible ones. Instead, flows include resources of a symbolic, legitimating nature. Literature on 
ambidexterity has to date focused on functionalist accounts of the performance-enhancing effects 
of ambidexterity, ignoring symbolic accounts of the rhetorical role ambidextrous actions and 
discourse may play in legitimating organizations and their units. In the CV setting, the value 
optimal distinctiveness (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), i.e. balancing strategic distinctiveness 
against normative appropriateness, to mitigating cognitive and socio-political challenges to CV 
unit legimitacy is readily apparent. It seems likely to us too that an interplay occurs between 
ambidexterity, legitimation and stakeholder relationships at the broader organizational level, and 
we encourage research that seeks to develop more constructivist understandings of the 
antecedents and effects of organizational ambidexterity. 
Finally, by focusing on resource access we are able to provide additional insight into the 
roles of senior managers in fostering ambidexterity. It has been established that senior managers 
have to learn to overcome cognitive contradictions (Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Smith & 
Tushman, 2005) and to build appropriate coordination mechanisms (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 
2009; Jansen et al., 2009; Tushman et al., 2010) to generate an appropriate mix of exploration 
and exploitation. Our research suggests, in addition, that they need to attend to the processes 
through which resources are acquired, combined and transformed to generate ambidextrous 
outcomes - processes that have to date received limited attention in ambidexterity literature (for a 
recent exception, see Jansen, Simsek, & Cao, 2012). 
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Implications for Corporate Venturing  
Our study builds on an emerging view that CV units embody explorative and exploitive 
modes of activity. While their role in investing in new ventures makes CV units prone to being 
labeled as exploration-focused, some recent authors (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Keil et al., 2008; 
Schildt et al., 2005; Williams & Lee, 2009) have noted that some venture units may instead focus 
on better exploiting the capabilities and assets of their parent companies. We extended this 
argument by suggesting that CV units may, in fact, increase their odds of survival by 
simultaneously combining these modes of activity.  
In finding support for the proposition that surviving CV units exhibit ambidexterity, we 
demonstrated that the simultaneity of exploration and exploitation as modes of learning might 
have positive consequences for corporate venturing activities. Resonating with studies indicating 
that CV units may function best when they invest in ventures that are moderately related to the 
existing business of the parent firm (e.g. Burgelman, 1984; Gompers & Lerner, 1988; Hill, 
Maula, Birkinshaw, & Murray, 2009; Sykes, 1986), the findings of this study suggest that a more 
nuanced understanding of the interplay of exploration and exploitation may be warranted in such 
units.  
As a second contribution to corporate venturing literature, our study suggests that 
ambidexterity may be a useful lens through which to address the topic of CV unit survival. It 
bears repeating that we are concerned here with the relationship between ambidexterity and the 
survival, rather than any other dimension of ‘success’, of CV units. Given the wide-spread 
perception of CV units as highly vulnerable entities that are frequently terminated before they are 
able to demonstrate returns (Burgelman & Valïkangas, 2005; Fast, 1981; Gaba, 2007), their 
survival is of significant interest. Of course, not all surviving CV units will end up performing 
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well, but the mortality rates of young, unproven CV units are sufficiently high (Dushnitsky, 
2012) that there is perceived to be a greater risk in killing off high-potential units than falsely 
prolonging the lives of low-potential units.  
Having said this, the implications of venturing ambidexterity on other measures of CV 
unit ‘success’ warrant future investigation. To recall our earlier arguments, we suggested that 
ambidexterity enhances the odds of CV unit survival for two reasons. From a substantive vantage 
point, we argued that parent companies benefit most from pursuing resource combinations that 
simultaneously draw on and extend their existing capabilities and assets. From a symbolic 
perspective, we argued that acting ambidextrously may help garner cognitive and socio-political 
acceptance for CV units, thereby allowing greater tolerance of the ‘disruption’ they may cause to 
an organization’s operating systems (Burgelman, 1984).  
A third mechanism that may contribute to the observed positive relationship between 
venturing ambidexterity and CV unit survival may be that of ‘entrenched’ relationships8 with 
stakeholders. In other words, a deeply-embedded set of relationships between a CV unit and its 
stakeholders inside and outside the parent company may encourage escalation of commitment to 
the venture unit (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981), making it hard to foreclose even where the unit is 
not performing well (Sull, 2003). On an anecdotal basis, we have seen some evidence of this 
phenomenon, notably where a CV unit was established as a legal entity with financing from 
external VCs. In cases where the CV unit is wholly-owned, our anecdotal evidence suggests 
corporate parents do not fall into the escalating commitment trap, and will quickly kill a CV unit 
that does not appear to be adding value to the corporate portfolio (Chandler, 1991). Taken as a 
whole, the survival of low performing or low potential CV units is clearly possible, but we 
believe it is not likely to be a wide-spread mechanism given the short duration of most CV units 
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in this third wave of corporate venturing (Dushnitsky, 2012), and thus the limited potential for 
relationships to become highly ‘entrenched’. 
Finally, in terms of the practical implications of the association between relational 
context and ambidexterity, we observe that ambidexterity may be achieved through engagement 
by CV units with all three constituencies examined here - parent company executives, members 
of other business units, and members of the VC community. While it is now standard practice in 
other areas of organization research to characterize informal organizations in terms of individual 
networks (e.g. Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973, 1985), there has been, until recently, very little 
attention paid to such approaches in corporate venturing research (cf. Keil et al., 2010). Instead, 
researchers have focused on traditional structural measures such as the reporting lines or the 
level of operating autonomy of the CV unit (e.g. Galbraith, 1982; Siegel et al., 1988; Sykes, 
1986). One potential contribution of this study, then, in examining the relational context of the 
CV unit, is to reorient corporate venturing research towards a richer characterization of the social 
context in which it operates. 
It should be noted, however, that the link between venturing ambidexterity and relational 
context is likely to be one of reciprocal causality. Engaging with executives, other business units 
and VCs enables CV units to broker the tangible and intangible resources they need to operate 
ambidextrously, while acting ambidextrously may, in turn, facilitate stronger relationships 
between CV units and their key internal and external constituencies. Unfortunately, given the 
cross-sectional nature of our data on CV unit relational context and ambidexterity, we were 
unable to test for reciprocality in the relationships between these constructs. We encourage 
longitudinal research that may seek to understand potential feedback cycles at play between 
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venturing ambidexterity, its relational antecedents, and legitimacy in the eyes of venturing 
constituencies. 
Limitations and Extensions 
Finally, a number of limitations should be acknowledged. One key factor is the specific 
time period over which our study was conducted, viz. 2001-2003. This represented a particularly 
volatile period in the recent history of corporate venturing. In 2000, some 500 corporations 
invested in excess of $20 billion in CVC activity (Maula & Murray, 2002). The volume of 
activity then declined substantially with the bursting of the ‘dotcom bubble’, but has risen again 
in recent years (Dushnitsky, 2006; Maula, 2007). Future studies hence need to establish the 
robustness of our findings over different (and less volatile) time periods. 
In addition, a number of methodological limitations stem from systemic obstacles to 
collecting valid and verifiable data on CV units (Dushnitsky, 2006; Gompers & Lerner, 1998; 
Maula, 2007). Developing a valid sampling frame presents a particular challenge where both 
internally- and externally-oriented CV units are of interest; there are no legal requirements for 
public companies to report the existence of a CV unit where this is not established as a separate 
legal entity. We relied principally on the CV units listed in the Corporate Venturing Directory 
and Yearbook (2001) in drawing up our sampling frame, but we also took a number of steps to 
counteract any potential bias towards over-sampling externally-oriented units. These included: 
asking the 50 individuals we interviewed, and working with executives at industry associations, 
to identify additional CV units; attending prominent corporate venturing conferences to further 
our search for additional units; and conducting an extensive web-based search for further units. 
Our relatively small sample size (95 CV units) also constrains our analysis. 
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Furthermore, the limited nature of public reporting on corporate venturing outcomes (and 
the confidentially attached by firms to these activities), and the dearth of archival data on the 
internal characteristics of CV units, necessitated a reliance on (mainly new) self-reported 
measures. It should be noted, however, that we undertook to supplement these with, most 
importantly, survival data, as well as VentureXpert data on the units’ investment histories. As 
pertains to our new measures, a number have reliability indices marginally below the customary 
.70 cut-off, including the measure for exploitation. Following Cortina (1993), advising against 
the routine rejection of alphas below .70 if the measures have desirable characteristics, such as 
meaningful coverage of a new content domain, we retain these measures in our analyses. In a 
related vein, our measure for ambidexterity is also new, devised for application to CV units, as 
well as to address the multiple considerations described in the Methods section. Careful thought 
went into the construction of our ambidexterity measures, and we undertook multiple steps to 
ensure their appropriateness. Future studies should however test the robustness of our findings to 
different measures of ambidexterity. Such measures should also attempt to more directly 
examine actual levels of exploration and exploitation demonstrated by CV units, rather than (per 
our formulation in this study) the importance of explorative and exploitive mandates to 
individual CV units. 
In addition to the above, further extensions that would be warranted include: detailed 
(and longitudinal) studies on the processes of resource acquisition and combination by CV units; 
the roles of building and using capabilities in achieving other corporate venturing objectives 
(such as strategic and financial performance indicators); and the practical implications of our 
findings of CV unit ambidexterity for designing resource allocation and human resource systems 
for CV units.  
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Conclusions 
While corporate venturing has long been seen as a useful way of developing new 
business opportunities in fast-changing markets, the evidence indicates that CV units have a high 
failure rate. This study hence sought to examine why and how some CV units last significantly 
longer than others. Our research suggests two conclusions: that combined attention to actors 
inside and outside the boundaries of the firm enables the CV unit to simultaneously make use of 
existing capabilities while also building new ones; and that, through this ambidextrous 
orientation, the CV unit is better able to coordinate and legitimate its activities such that it 
enhances its odds of having an ongoing role as part of the parent firm. Thus, while CV units 
constitute a structural option through which firms may seek to balance exploration and 
exploitation, such units may paradoxically, in turn, require an ambidextrous orientation 
themselves in order to fulfill this role. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Financial returns or other reasonably ‘objective’ measures of CV unit performance are 
notoriously hard to come by. While the VentureXpert database does enable some financial 
performance measures to be calculated at the venture level for many portfolio ventures belonging 
to CVC units, this research study includes a mix of internally-focused and externally-focused 
units. We are thus unable to measure venture unit level financial performance objectively across 
our entire sample. 
2 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to employ this distinction 
in building H2. 
3 The peak of the dotcom era was April 2000, but corporate venturing activity peaked one 
year later; corporations were slower in making initial investments as well as in divesting (Maula, 
2007; Maula & Murray, 2002). 
4 The most frequently occurring job titles of responding CV unit heads were ‘Managing 
Director’ (20 respondents), ‘Vice President’ (20 respondents), ‘Director’ (12 respondents) and 
‘President’ (8 respondents). 
5 We found only six CV units to not conform clearly to our operational definitions of 
‘survivor unit’ or ‘non-surviving unit’ at the time of our follow-up: of these, two had had a 
majority stake sold off by their respective parent companies; three were reported to be ‘operating 
on a reduced mandate’ or ‘winding down’; and the future of another was uncertain given the 
pending merger of its parent company with another firm. While we coded these units as 
surviving and included them in the analyses, they do not prove material to the pattern of results 
attained. 
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6 We recognize that the frequency of communication between a CV unit and a key 
stakeholder does not provide a perfect proxy of the strength of their relationship. Although this 
conceptualization is well established in scholarly literature (cf. Burt, 1992; Granovetter and 
colleagues, 1973, 1995, 2009; Hansen and colleagues, 1999, 2004, 2005; Reagans, 2005), and 
we believe that this proxy will for the most part provide a reasonable indication of relationship 
strength, exceptions are certainly conceivable. For example, long-standing, close relationships 
may perhaps be maintained with relatively lesser communication than newer relationships, and 
in some instances frequent communication may also be an indicator of monitoring activities 
between parties. In respect of the latter, including control variables for the degree of CV unit 
autonomy should mitigate against such a role affecting our analyses. 
7 Equivalent analyses were not conducted for H1 as the alternative conceptions constitute 
linear combinations of the lower-order direct effects of exploration and exploitation on survival 
already tested for. 
8 We are grateful to action editor, Laura Poppo, for drawing this alternative explanation 
to our attention. 





Construct Items Response Format Reliability Eigenvalue % Variance 
Extracted 




“How important is this (venture unit) objective to the 
corporation?” 
1. Retention and motivation of our employees 
2. Better use of existing corporate assets 
3. Creation of spin-out companies 
4. Source of funding for internal entrepreneurs 
3-point scale, where 1 = not at all important, 2 = minor importance, 
and 3 = major importance 
.68 2.05 51 
Build new capabilities 
(exploration) 
“How important is this (venture unit) objective to the 
corporation?” 
1. Creation of breakthrough technology for the 
corporation  
2. Investment in disruptive technologies that 
potentially cannibalize existing technologies 
3. Window on emerging technologies 
3-point scale, where 1 = not at all important, 2 = minor importance, 
and 3 = major importance 
.70 1.86 63 
Relationship with 
senior executives 
“Indicate the frequency with which you, or your team, 
communicate with the following individuals or units:” 
1. The senior executives in the corporate parent you 
report directly to 
2. Other senior executives in the corporate parent / 
head office 
5-point scale, where 1 = daily, 2 = weekly, 3 = monthly, 4 = rarely, 
and 5 = never (reverse scored) 
.67 1.52 76 
Relationship with 
business units 
“Indicate the frequency with which you, or your team, 
communicate with the following individuals or units:” 
1. Executives in business units/divisions of the 
corporate parent 
2. Technical/R&D people in the corporate business 
units/divisions 
3. Front line/middle management in corporate 
business units/divisions 
5-point scale, where 1 = daily, 2 = weekly, 3 = monthly, 4 = rarely, 
and 5 = never (reverse scored) 
.87 2.38 79 
Relationship with the 
venture capital 
community 
“Indicate the frequency with which you, or your team, 
communicate with the following individuals or units:” 
1. Partner VC companies 
2. Other companies or individuals in the VC 
community 
5-point scale, where 1 = daily, 2 = weekly, 3 = monthly, 4 = rarely, 
and 5 = never (reverse scored) 
.86 1.80 .90 
Control variables 
Internal investments “Please indicate the extent to which you do the 
following:” 
1. We invest in internally-generated business ideas to 
promote organic growth 
2. We invest in internally-generated business ideas 
with a view to spinning them out as separate 
5-point scale, where 1 = never, 2 = only in exceptional cases, 3 = 
occasionally, 4 = frequently, and 5 = almost always 
.73 1.97 .90 




3. We invest in internally-generated business ideas to 
leverage under-utilized corporate assets (e.g. IP) 
Autonomy (vertical) “Please indicate the extent to which you are free to make 
the following decisions:” 
1. Trade sale of a venture business 
2. Closure/termination of a venture business 
3. Decision to pursue IPO for venture business 
4. Establishment of investment criteria for new 
businesses 
Decision made exclusively by unit managers (=1); with ratification 
by or consultation with corporate board/executives (=2); or 
primarily by corporate board/executives (=3) (reverse scored) 
.86 2.81 .70 
Autonomy (horizontal) “If a potential business venture is in the domain of an 
existing business unit, to what extent do you do the 
following:” 
1. Seek their cooperation in working with us on the 
business venture 
2. Require their approval/sign-off before we make an 
investment 
3. Try to encourage them to retain ownership of the 
venture, even if we provide funding 
Decision made exclusively by unit managers (=1); with ratification 
by or consultation with corporate board/executives (=2); or 
primarily by corporate board/executives (=3) (reverse scored) 
.66 1.86 .62 
Strategic performance How well does the unit deliver on this objective?” 
1. Creation of breakthrough technology for the 
corporation 
2. Investment in disruptive technologies that 
potentially cannibalize existing technologies 
3. Development of strategic relationships with 
external suppliers/customers/competitors 
4. Source of funding for internal entrepreneurs 
5-point scale, where 1 = below expectation, 3 = equal to 
expectation, and 5 = above expectation 
.74 2.27 .57 
Financial performance “How well does the unit deliver on this objective?” 
1. Financial return to the corporation (e.g. IRR) 
2. Contribution to top-line growth 
3. Increased valuation of corporate stock 
5-point scale, where 1 = below expectation, 3 = equal to 
expectation, and 5 = above expectation 
.72 1.43 .72 
 




Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Dependent Variable                   
1. CV unit survivala .77 -                 
Independent Variables                   
2. Use existing capabilities 
(Exploitation) 1.75 .51 -.05       
         
3. Build new capabilities 
(Exploration) 2.36 .55 .18 .16      
         
4. Relationship with senior 
executives 3.43 .75 .21 .02 .31     
         
5. Relationship with business 
units 3.41 .95 .17 .04 .42 .57    
         
6. Relationship with venture 
capital community 3.49 .98 .26 -.18 .21 -.02 .22   
         
Control Variables                   
7. Age of unit 4.47 5.20 .05 -.01 .03 -.04 -.09 .00           
8. Hi-tech sectorb .51 - -.09 -.19 -.09 .09 .06 .03 .24          
9. CVC investmentsc .76 - .27 -.24 .13 -.04 -.08 .39 .13 -.02         
10. Number of investments 40.39 121.5 .14 .03 .07 .18 .18 .22 .30 .20 .15        
11. Number of unit employees 16.73 38 -.03 .10 .08 .20 .21 .08 .09 .15 .01 .81       
12. Internal investments 2.19 .97 -.15 .55 -.05 .10 .01 -.34 .03 -.04 -.30 -.06 .02      
13. Financing structured .35 - -.18 -.14 .10 .13 .13 -.06 .08 .10 -.10 .19 .13 .01     
14. Autonomy (horizontal) 3.42 1.55 .11 -.11 -.20 -.28 -.12 .01 -.02 .04 .06 .00 .01 -.14 -.11    
15. Autonomy (vertical) 2.13 .57 .22 -.17 -.20 -.14 -.13 .25 .09 .01 .05 .11 -.01 -.31 -.16 .35   
16. Strategic performance 3.36 .60 .34 .11 .36 .09 .14 .40 .08 -.09 .43 .14 -.03 .01 -.16 -.03 -.01  
17. Financial performance 3.07 .61 .18 .16 .09 -.04 -.01 .18 .22 .03 .11 .23 .11 .13 .01 -.14 .05 .20 
 
n = 95 (CV units)  a Dummy variable (1 = surviving unit)  b Dummy variable (1 = parent company in a hi-tech sector)  c Dummy variable (1 = unit active in VentureXpert database)  d Dummy variable (1 
= all financing decisions on venture investments made by parent company)  All correlations with absolute values greater than .21 are significant at the .05 level. 
 




Comparison of Structural Modelsa, b 








Model 1        
Null Model 94.15 100.76 91.32 -44.07    
        
Model 2        
Baseline Model (i.e. excluding hypothesized 
interaction effects) 89.53 157.87 60.27 -13.76 Model 2 vs. 1 28 62.27*** 
        
Model 3        





        
Model 4        





        
Model 5        
Hypothesized Model 
81.53 154.29 50.38 -7.766 
Model 5 vs. 1 
Model 5 vs. 2 
Model 5 vs. 3 










a All models include the control variables. 
b Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 include the appropriate lower-order terms for the tested interactions. 
c Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference test. 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; Adj. BIC = Sample-size adjusted Bayesian 
Information Criterion. 
n = 95. *** p<.001  ** p<.01  * p<.05   




Ambidexterity in Technical Core and Boundary Spanning Units 
 Technical Core Boundary Spanning Units 
Primary learning orientation Primarily exploitation Primarily exploration 
Secondary learning orientation Secondary focus on exploration Secondary focus on exploration 
Relationship to task environment Buffered from task environment Deliberately interacting with task environment 
Primary performance imperative Efficiency imperative Effectiveness imperative 
Consequences of failure Obsolescence Closure 
Critical context Behavioral context Relational context 
Primary source of cues Cues taken from internal parties Cues taken from both external and internal  parties 
 































a Standardized parameter estimates shown. This is a simplified version of the actual model, omitting the control variables, lower-
order terms for the interaction effects, error terms and residual variances.  
Control variables comprise age of unit, hi-tech sector, CVC investments, number of unit employees, number of investments, 
internal investments, horizontal autonomy and vertical autonomy. Strategic performance, financial performance, their interaction, 
and financing structure were included as additional controls in testing H1. 
One-tailed tests. 
n = 95. *** p<.001  ** p<.01  * p<.05   
 
Ambidexterity and Survival in Corporate Venture Units 
61 
 
FIGURES 2A AND 2B. 
Three-Way Interaction Effects of Relational Context on Venturing Ambidexteritya 
 

























































a The end-points of the x-axes reflect the values for the relationship with senior executives variable at one standard 
deviation below and above its (centred) mean. 
 
